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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants appeal
District Court
Motion to

an Order dated December 1, 1986, by First

Judge, VeNoy

Quash a

Christoffersen, denying Defendants'

Writ of Execution.

Defendants filed on December 2, 1986,

Subsequent to that Order,
a Rule

52(b) Objection to

Form of Order.
Defendants moved

that the

Writ of

Execution be quashed on

the basis that a judgment rendered on April 18, 1979, be declared
not to

bear interest

thereon and that therefore the Writ was in

excess of the judgment.
Plaintiffs specifically dispute that this appeal
Further, that

the court's

jurisdiction of

is timely.

this appeal has been

properly invoked.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
In

addition

to

Defendants, Plaintiffs

responding

to

the

issues

raised

by

consider the following issues relevant to

this appeal:
1.

Was the appeal timely.

2.

Does the judgment bear interest.

3.

Are partnership issues applicable.
RELEVANT LAW

Rule 4 - URAP;
Appeal from final judgment and order.
In a case in
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from
the district court to the Supreme Court, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk
of the district court within 30 days after the date of
1

entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Section 15-1-14 UCA (1953):
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall
conform thereto and shall bear interest agreed upon by
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment;
other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12%
per annum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants based upon a
simple promissory note.
Partnership

was

Trial Record at 1-4.

determined

to

be

a

Defendants Malouf, White and Stocking were

Defendant Emporium

limited

general partners.

copy of said note was attached to the Complaint.
4.

The

principal

complaint
of

requested

$15,000.00.

interest,
Upon

partnership,

Trial Record at

attorney's

filing

several

Plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings.

A

fees plus
affidavits

Trial Record at

13-14.
Defendants resisted

solely on

could be rendered

because

limited partner.

Trial

Plaintiff
Record at

rendered judgment in favor of the
Trial Record at 36-41.

the ground
Helen
26-29.

that no judgment

Barber

was

also a

The court thereupon

Plaintiffs on

April 18, 1979.

The judgment recites in relevant part:

IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Plaintiffs
have
recovered
judgment
against the
Defendants in the amount due on a promissory note in
the amount of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars
plus accrued interest at the rate of 12 percent per
annum from date hereof until paid in the amount of
Twenty-one Hundred Eighty ($2,180.00) Dollars, attorney
fees in the amount of Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollars
and court costs in the amount of Thirty-one and 30/100
($31.30) Dollars.
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Thereafter Defendants moved to Amend the
the

issues

being

attorney's fees.
June 5,

1979.

raised

in

that

motion

Trial Record at 49-51.

Judgment.
was

the

One of

basis for

That motion was denied

In the denial the court noted that its denial did

not preclude the Defendants from raising issues as to enforcement
methods

or

priorities

judgment is
Memorandum

sought to
Decision

relative

to

the

be enforced.

of

May

21,

partnership

Trial

when the

Record at

59. The

1979, upon which it was based

stated:
Defendant has filed a Motion for Amendment to the
Judgment, Relief from Judgment and Stay of Execution.
Generally the thrust of Defendants' argument goes to
questions of how the judgment should be enforced and
priorities in connection therewith.
Therefore, Defendants' motion is denied, of course,
without prejudice to take any appropriate action when
*-he judgment is sought to be enforced
Clearly the issues of interest and
left open.

accrued

are not

Defendants filed no appeal from that Order.

In 1982
alleging

attorney's fees

Defendants attempted to Strike a Writ of Execution,

the
on

Writ

the

was

erroneous

judgment.

See

because
Motion

November 2, 1982, Trial Record at 101.
October 28,

1982, the

court again

interest
to

In

was being

Strike Writ dated

the

Memorandum of

denied these Motions.

Trial

Record at 101.
In December, 1982, the
issue in

another Motion

response the
Trial

Record

court
at

Defendants

to Quash.

issued
185-86,

the
see

again

raised

the same

Trial Record at 138,181. In

Writ

which

included interest*

also the Order of April 5, 1982,
3

Trial Record at 544, On

August 19,

raised the

Trial Record at 206, 208-09, 256. This

same issue.

motion is again denied.

1986, again

the Defendants

Trial Record at 257-58.

The Plaintiff appeals to this court the same issues decided
by the

lower court

in 1979,

repetition in November 1986.
bears

interest.

The

1982 and earlier in 1986 albeit by
That issue is

amount

of

whether the Barbers can have a
limited partner

whether the judgment

attorney's

fees awarded and

judgment where

are also appealed.

one of

them is a

The November 1986 Order only

addresses the interest question.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the facts

cited

by

the

Appellants/Defendants are

characterizations of the trial court's responses, memorandums and
orders.
forth

Plaintiffs dispute
the

trial

court's

that Defendants
responses.

have accurately set

Rather than belabor these

points, Plaintiffs summarize the salient parts

of the

record as

follows.
Defendants

mischaracterize

the

record

in

the

following

particulars:
1.

Judgment:

plus accrued

The judgment

interest of

is for

no

interest

The language

while

will

of the note

$2,180.00 to the date of the judgment.

Defendants mischaracterize interest as
that

the amount

being a

fixed amount and

ever thereafter accrue on the judgment.

somewhat

unclear

simply

does

not support

Defendants' allegations, which are also ridiculous on their face.
Trial Record at 40.
4

2.

Order of June 5, 1979:

leaves

open

indefinitely

interest and
does

not

whether indeed

do

this.

enforcement mechanics
attempted.

It

Defendants argue that this order

the

questions

of

any judgment
simply

attorney's

fees,

has been entered.

indicates

with

respect

It
to

they will be reviewed at the time they are

Trial Record at 59,

3.

Court's

Refusal

to

Address

Issues:

Defendants

characterize the trial court as refusing to address issues. This
is simply not the case.
refer

Defendants

to

At some point the court simply

its

previous

began to

orders or to limitations on

their efforts to repeatedly reopen resolved issues.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Appeal Is Untimely.
Defendants

earlier which

appeal
are past

The fact that the
Order on

issues

the stage

trial court

December 1,

resolved

in

where they

repeats its

1986, is

decisions

irrelevant.

decided

can be appealed.

same decision

in an

The appeal did not

occur within the required time periods.
II.

The Judgment Does Bear Interest.
Pursuant to

either the
The note

Section 15-1-4

legal rate

provides for

or the

all judgments
rate agreed

interest at

after judgment.

5

bear interest at

upon by the parties.

12 percent

(12%) before and

III.

Partnership Issues Are Not Applicable.
Partnership law

simply does not support the theory that the

Plaintiffs have no right to obtain a judgment on this amount.
any event

this decision

is clearly

decided as

In

of 1979 in this

case.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Appeal Is Untimely.
The four issues raised

by

Defendants

resolved by the trial court in 1979.
not timely under Rule

6

or

any

on

appeal

were all

An appeal in 1987 is simply

of

the

methods

of extension

thereunder.
The
Judgment

first
in

issue

1979

re^^.rdin^ i^t'^r^^t W9?

and

confirmed

in

decided

subsequent

in the

Orders.

See

discussion at pages 3-4 hereof.
The second

issue regarding attorney's fees was specifically

raised by Defendant on May 21, 1979, in their Reply at Section 4.
Trial Record
5, 1979.

at 57. That motion was denied in the Order of June

Trial Record at 59.

The third and fourth issues were raised before
and resolved

by it.

the judgment

Trial Record at 26-28, 30-32, 34-35, 39 and

40.
All of these issues have long

been resolved

and any appeal

even in the face of manifest error would be untimely.

6

II.

Judgments Do Bear Interest.
Section 15-1-4

provides that judgments bear interest at the

contract or legal rate.
976,

Western

In

Conference

of

held that interest follows
Utah 2d

85, 396

P 2d

Dairy Distributors,
Teamsters,

a judgment

47.

the Utah Supreme Court

as a

The Dairy

Inc., v. Local

matter of

law.

16

case further held that a

judgment did not need to recite that it would bear interest.
Herein the promissory note provides for interest "before and
after judgment" at twelve percent (12%).

Trial Record at 4.

judgment recites that the interest is at twelve
not

specifically

state

that

rendition of the judgment.
at best,

it

continues

Trial Record at

percent but does
to

40.

accrue

after

Defendants, in

a disingenuous argument, urge this court to misread the

judgment to effect that only $2,180.00 interest will
the date

The

of the judgment until paid.

accrue from

That is the amount of pre-

judgment interest not post-judgment interest for no one knows the
amount thereof in 1979.
The reference to "date hereof" is not to the judgment but to
the complaint alleging accrued interest of $2,180.00 to
hereof [meaning

the date

Rather than haggle with
the $2,180.00

of the complaint].
the Defendants,

the date

Trial Record at 1.

Plaintiffs have allowed

as being to the date of the judgment although that

is mathematically incorrect.

Trial Record at 256.

the judgment determines the amount owing as:
$15,000.00
2,180.00
4,000.00

Principal
Accrued Interest
Attorney's Fees
7

In

any event

31,30

Costs

$21,211.30
It

is

from

this

Total Judgment
figure

which

Plaintiffs

have

interest at the contract rate of 12 percent (12%) as

accrued

provided in

the note and judgment.
A

careful

reading

of

the

judgment

Plaintiffs have recovered judgment".
of interest

as being

used in the past
awarded.

It

or
is

$2,180.00.
present

not

It then recites

that "the
the amount

The words "have recovered" are

tense

future

indicates

and

as

to

does

the

amount thereby

not address what will

thereafter accrue.
III.

Partnership Issues Are Not Applicable:
Defendants attempt to raise

various

the third and fourth issues on appeal.

in 1979.

Defendants

issues as

These issues don't appear

related to the December 1, 1986, Order.
the Judgment

partneiship

They were

are arguing

foreclosed by
the same issues

they argued before the Judgment in 1979.
In response, Plaintiffs simply stand on the argument made by
Attorney B.

H. Harris

in his

Reply to Defendants1 Response for

Motion of Judgment on the Pleadings of 1979.

These arguments are

hereby incorporated herein as follows:
1.
In the first paragraph of Defendants'
response, they attempt to have the court believe
that at the time the Plaintiffs complaint was
filed on January 17, 1979, in this matter, that
both
the
Plaintiffs
herein,
were limited
partners. Defendants offer a letter in evidence
dated February 19, 1979, which is dated more than
a month after the commencement of this action
8

claiming that this letter constitutes an apparent
assignment by HELEN BARBER to her husband NORMAN
BARBER
of
half
interest
in
her limited
partnership interest.
It is academic that the legal rights and
status of the parties are determined as of the
date of the commencement of the action.
The
record is clear and beyond dispute at the time of
the commencement of this action the plaintiff
NORMAN BARBER had no interest whatever in the
limited partnership. HELEN BARBER was the sole
limited partner.
See attached copy of the
limited partnership
agreement to Plaintiffs1
complaint.
The fact that Mrs. Barber expressed a desire
in her letter of February 19, 1979, to have the
limited partnership interest placed in both names
does not constitute an assignment of her interest
to
her
husband.
Formal execution of an
assignment would
be required.
Until this
assignment
was
made
and
filed
with the
partnership, the partnership records must stand
as originally created.
The partnership records
cannot be changed otherwise.
2.
As
to
the
second
paragraph of
1
Defendants response, the Plaintiffs assert that
the counsel for the Defendants is completely
confused when he states that an attempt by
Plaintiffs to recover a judgment for the loan
made to the partnership, is an attempt to return
part of this capital contribution of a limited
partnership.
The court can see that the loan of
Fifteen Thousand
($15,000)
Dollars
to the
partnership and a capital contribution of Forty
Thousand ($40,000) Dollars by HELEN BARBER are
separate and
independent acts
and have no
relationship to one another.
3.
Throughout the
pleadings and the
1
Defendants
memorandums filed in this matter,
there is no
question
that
the Defendants
acknowledge that the loan of Fifteen Thousand
($15,000)
Dollars
is
represented
by
the
Promissory Note.
Defendants admit in fact, a
loan made by the Plaintiffs to the partnership.
Under the limited partnership of the State of
Utah, it makes no difference whether the note is
signed by two or all three of the general
partners, as a note signed by
any general
partners for partnership business is binding on
all the general partners.
4. There is no question that under the Utah
Limited Partnership Act that a limited partner
9

may loan funds to the partnership.
5. Defendants assert in Paragraph 6 that
before one partner can sue another partner there
must be a general accounting and dissolution of
the partnership.
This certainly is not the law.
This suit is based upon a separate isolated loan
transaction. A debtor/creditor relationship that
exists between the Plaintiffs and the separate
from the capital interest in the partnership.
It is the general rule that one partner may
sue another at law on transactions between them
as individuals involving matters not so connected
to the partnership as to involve partnership
accounting.
60 Am Jur 2nd, page 240 states: "If one
partner gives the other his Promissory Note or
his separate acceptance on a partnership account,
an action of law will lie on such note or bill
since such
instrument itself constitutes an
acknowledgement of a separate debt.ff
Footnote 20 at page 240 states:
"A note
given by one partner for a loan by his co-partner
of his individual money to be used by the former
in paying debt of a solvent partnership does not
involve an accounting and therefore, an action of
law may be maintained thereon."
The Plaintiffs
renew Lheii iecjacsL foi
judgment upon the pleadings and ask the court to
rule accordingly.
Trial Record at 30-32 (footnotes omitted).
Obviously, this
appeal.

In any

issue has

event, the

long since

argument of

been foreclosed from

Defendants lacks merit

just as it did in 1979 when the trial court so ruled.

CONCLUSION

10

Plaintiffs request
because

it

is

judgment does

this court to dismiss Defendants1 appeal

untimely.

Plaintiffs

bear interest.

further

Plaintiffs

limited

partner

as

that the

are not estopped from

collecting the same because one of the Plaintiffs
a

urge

happened to be

to other financial involvements with the

Defendants.
Plaintiffs suggest to the court that
to file

a cost

bond on

appeal pursuant

further suggest that this is
enter

a

formal

judgment

an

for

Defendants have failed
to Rule 6.

appropriate

case

Plaintiffs
in

which to

double costs and attorney's fees

pursuant to Rule 33, URAP.
DATED this 12th day of June, 1987.
DAINES & KANE
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